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A NEW RESILIENCE INDEX FOR URBAN WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS 1 
G.P. Cimellaro1, A.Tinebra2, C.Renschler3, M.Fragiadakis4 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
The increased frequency of natural disasters and man-made catastrophes has caused major disruptions to 4 
critical infrastructures (CI) such as Water Distribution Networks (WDNs).  Therefore, reducing the 5 
vulnerability of the systems through physical and organizational restoration plans are the main concern 6 
for system engineers and utility managers that are responsible for the design, operation, and protection 7 
of WDNs.  In this paper, a Resilience Index (R) of a WDN has been proposed which is the product of 8 
three indices: (i) the number of users temporary without water, (ii) the water level in the tank, and (iii) 9 
the water quality.  The Resilience Index is expected to help planners and engineers to evaluate the 10 
functionality of a WDN which includes: (1) delivering a certain demand of water with an acceptable 11 
level of pressure and quality; (2) the restoration process following an extreme event. A small town in the 12 
South of Italy has been selected as a case study to show the applicability of this index using different 13 
disruptive scenarios and restoration plans.  The numerical results show the importance of the partition of 14 
the network in districts to reduce the extension of disservices. It is also shown the necessity to consider 15 
the indices separately to find trends that cannot be captured by the global index. Advantages and 16 
disadvantages of the different restoration plans are discussed.  The proposed indices can be implemented 17 
in a decision support tool used by governmental agencies which want to include the restoration process, 18 
the environmental and social aspects in their design procedure. 19 
 20 
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The water distribution networks and the Critical Infrastructures (CI) in general provide services by 24 
allowing flows of fuels, materials, information, electric power etc..  The disruptions change the 25 
operability state of parts of the network (e.g. nodes and/or links), and then the recovery actions restore 26 
the functionality of the damaged parts of the network, allowing the performance of the system to return 27 
to the nominal levels as fast as possible.  In the past, emphasis was given to the physical protection of 28 
water distribution networks, but now attention is shifting toward the infrastructure resilience, defined as 29 
the ability of infrastructure systems to withstand, adapt to, and rapidly recover from the effects of a 30 
disruptive event.  This concept is becoming increasingly important in the context of CIs and defining 31 
infrastructure functionality is essential for evaluating its resilience (Cimellaro et al., 2014a).  Although 32 
several authors (Holling, 1973; Mileti, 1999; Fiksel, 2003) have worked in the field of Disaster 33 
Resilience, Bruneau et al. (2003) offered the first broad definition of this quantity including the effects 34 
of losses, mitigation and rapid recovery.  In their study, they identify four dimensions of community 35 
resilience, namely: i) technical, ii) organizational, iii) social, and iv) economic.  However, in their work 36 
they did not provide a detailed quantification of it, but rather a collection of quantitative performance 37 
criteria for each property.  After the general framework provided by Bruneau et al., various studies have 38 
been carried out, with the goal of evaluating resilience and identifying its main units of measurement.  39 
For example, Cimellaro et al. (2005, 2010a), formulated the first framework to quantify resilience, 40 
where uncertainties in the intensity measures were considered.  Chang and Shinozuka (2004) refined the 41 
method proposed by Bruneau (2003), by proposing a metric of system performance Q, which is 42 
evaluated comparing the extreme events scenario with the normal operating conditions and they applied 43 
the method to the case study of the Memphis water system.  Miles and Chang (2006) presented a 44 
comprehensive conceptual model of recovery, which establishes the relationships between a 45 
community’s household business, lifeline networks and neighborhoods. Even if a measure of resilience 46 
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is not provided in their work, the paper points out the necessity to correlate the concept of recovery to 47 
real factors, such as household income, the year the structure was built, etc..  The same year Cagnan et 48 
al. (2006) has developed a model of post-earthquake restoration processes for an electric power system. 49 
A discrete event simulation model based on available data has been built, with the goal of improving the 50 
restoration processes in future earthquakes.   51 
Several authors have used the resiliency concept as input in decision support methodologies that assist 52 
authorities in prioritizing infrastructure investments for disaster mitigation, emergency response and 53 
recovery activities. In particular, it has been applied to hospitals (Cimellaro et al., 2010b; Cimellaro and 54 
Pique`, 2014a), lifeline structures (Ouyang and Duenas-Osorio, 2011, Cimellaro et al., 2014b; Ouyang, 55 
2014) and cities (Chang et al, 2014) using different optimization methods based on economic (Chang 56 
and Shinozuka, 2004), downtime (Cagnan et al., 2006) or multi-criteria analysis (Javanbarg et al., 2008).  57 
Recently Cimellaro et al. (2014c) have developed a new methodology to evaluate resilience on physical 58 
infrastructures including their interdependencies using time series analysis and applying it to the 2011 59 
Tohoku earthquake in Japan.   60 
According to the literature, several methods are available for quantifying resilience of infrastructure 61 
systems which can be grouped in probabilistic methods (Miller-Hooks et al, 2012, Queiroz et al., 2013), 62 
graph theory methods (Berche et al, 2009; Leu et al., 2010, Dorbritz, 2011), fuzzy methods (Heaslip et 63 
al., 2010) and analytical methods (Cimellaro et al., 2010; Tamvakis and Xenidis, 2013).   64 
Miller-Hooks et al. (2012) proposed a non-linear, stochastic program addressing an integer L-shaped 65 
method associated with Monte Carlo simulations to quantify resilience. However, the method is 66 
computationally unaffordable for real systems which include a large number of interdependent nodes.  67 
Dorbritz (2011) combined the approach of Bruneau et al. (2003), with network analysis and proposed a 68 
resilience quantification method that tries to introduce, also, the complex network concepts introduced 69 
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by Berche et al. (2009) for the public transportation network. Heaslip et al. (2010) developed a method 70 
to assess and quantify resilience using Fuzzy Inference Systems (FIS). In particular, they developed a 71 
hierarchically structured dependency diagram of variables that can represent the performance hierarchy 72 
levels.  However, the use of more intuitive values for variables that quantify resilience may have an 73 
effect on the accuracy of assessments and may complicate the decision making process. Furthermore, a 74 
complete FIS should include a large number of variables and rules which might make the method 75 
computationally unaffordable.  Recently, Tamvakis and Xenidis (2013) proposed a framework based on 76 
entropy theory concepts. Entropy describes the system’s disorder at a given point in time and it is 77 
measurable in a single metric analogously to resilience which describes the system’s potential to recover 78 
to a desired system’s condition.  Although the idea seems promising, they fail to provide details about 79 
the method and applications which show the feasibility of the methodology.   80 
When considering the reliability of infrastructures, the different methodologies available in literature 81 
can be grouped in two main categories: (i) simulation-based models and (ii) analytical methods (Kim et 82 
al., 2010). (i) Simulation-based models involve the use of random sampling techniques and Monte Carlo 83 
simulation to approximate system functionality.  For example, Wang and O-Rourke (2008) characterized 84 
the performance of a large water supply system in term of system reliability and serviceability.  They 85 
use probabilistic seismic hazard analysis, theoretical and empirical relations to estimate pipeline 86 
response.  (ii) Analytical methods do not require repeated sampling and therefore they allow more rapid 87 
computations, but they are based on assumptions that sometimes might not fit to the problem at hand 88 
(Francis and Bekera, 2014; Davis, 2014).   89 
In the last decade, several metrics have been proposed in literature to measure the performance of 90 
WDNs.  A good state of the art is available in Jalal (2008).  For example, Todini (2000) proposed an 91 
index which is a measure of the capability of the network to cope with failures and it is related indirectly 92 
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to system reliability.  Other authors have also extended this resilience index to overcome certain 93 
drawbacks (Prasad and Park, 2004; Jayaram and Srinivasan, 2008), such as the inapplicability of the 94 
index in networks with multiple sources.  They have listed the theoretical advantages of their 95 
approaches, but none of them has compared the performance of these resilience indices.  Recently, 96 
Davis (2014) in his work has defined 5 categories of water services. He has compared pre and post-97 
disaster services and has distinguished between operability and functionality.  Of course, the literature 98 
review presented above cannot be comprehensive, but many of the works cited are based on the review 99 
of previous works to quantify resilience, therefore it is still adequate to identify the different trends to 100 
quantify resilience of infrastructures.   101 
In this study, a Resilience Index (R) for a water distribution system has been proposed to measure 102 
its performance. The proposed index R is defined as the product of three indices: one describes the 103 
demand and is based on the number of users temporary without water (R1); the second describes the 104 
capacity and is based on the tank water height (R2); the third (R3) is based on the water quality.  These 105 
indices will help planners and engineers to evaluate the functionality of a water distribution system 106 
which consists in delivering a certain demand of water with an acceptable level of pressure and quality. 107 
A small town located in a seismic region in Italy, has been used as a case study. The WDN has been 108 
analyzed using the software EPANET 2.0 (Rossman, 2000) and different restoration plans have been 109 
compared using the proposed resilience indices.   110 
RESILIENCE OF WATER DISTRIBUTION NETWORK  111 
The definition that has been used in this paper to quantify resilience of the WDN is the one provided in 112 
the work of Bruneau et al. (2003) where resilience is defined as the ability of a system to reduce the 113 
chances of shock, to absorb such a shock if it occurs and to recovery quickly after a shock.  Later the 114 
same definition has been quantified and extended by Cimellaro et al. (2010a, b), where the resilience 115 
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index (R) has been defined as a function indicating the capability to sustain a level of functionality for a 116 
given building, bridge, lifeline networks, or community, over a period defined as the Control Time (TLC) 117 
that is usually decided by owners, or society (e.g. life cycle of the system, etc.).  An essential parameter 118 
for the definition of Resilience of the WDN is the definition of functionality/performance index which is 119 
provided in the next paragraph.   120 
Definition of a new performance index for Water Distribution Networks  121 
Earthquake effects on water supply systems have been investigated extensively in literature and different 122 
methodologies for estimating the reliability and serviceability of water supply systems heavily damaged 123 
by earthquake are available in literature (Ballantyne et al., 1990; Taylor, 1991; Shinozuka et al., 1992; 124 
Markov et al., 1994; and Hwang et al., 1998).  The proposed index is composed of three parts which 125 
depend on the number of households that would suffer water outage, the tank water level and the water 126 
quality.  The first part of the index is proportional to the system serviceability index (SSI) proposed by 127 
Todini (2000), which is defined as the ratio of the sum of satisfied water demands after an earthquake to 128 
that before an earthquake.  In detail, three performance functions F1(t) , F2(t) and F3(t) have been 129 
presented.  F1(t) relates to the number of households without water, therefore it is related to the social 130 
dimension of the resilience problem. Analytically it is defined as  131 
,
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 where nd,e
i  are the number of Demand Nodes which are assumed directly proportional to the water 137 
volume lost WLost during the extreme event and the repair operations;  I is an intensity parameter; TR is 138 
the recovery period which is defined as the period necessary to restore the functionality of a system to a 139 
desired level that can operate or function the same, close to, or better than the original one (Cimellaro et 140 
al, 2010).  In detail, nd,e
i  is given by the following equation  141 
,
i
i Lost
d e i
i
W
n n
W
                                                                                                                                (3) 142 
 where i indicates the general node in which the pressure is insufficient to ensure the demand water flow; 143 
ni is the total number of entities connected to node i; WLost
i is the water volume lost and Wi is the water 144 
volume that the entities would consume in normal operating conditions. To evaluate the volume of water 145 
lost and the volume of water in normal operating conditions, the following equations have been used 146 
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where tj and tj+1 are generic instants after the extreme event (t > t1); QDemand is the water demand flow at 149 
the instant t and Qi is the real water flow at the time t afterwards the damage of the pipe.  For a given 150 
extreme event, the general form of F1(t) is shown in Figure 1a.  The control time TLC has been divided in 151 
four different period ranges. TNF-I is the normal operating functionality period before the earthquake; TM 152 
is the operating period range immediately after the earthquake and before the first emergency 153 
operations; TE is the transition period when the water system is partially in service; TNF-II is the normal 154 
operating functionality after the repair operations. Moreover, t1 is the time instant when the extreme 155 
event occurs, t2 is the time instant when the damaged pipe is isolated, t3 is the time instant when the 156 
repair operations are finished and t4 is a generic instant when the system works in normal operating 157 
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conditions. The difference between t3 and t1 corresponds to the Recovery Time TR..  Then the restoration 158 
process has been divided in two phases: Phase I is the time interval necessary for the first emergency 159 
operations and the isolation of the area where the damage happens, while Phase II is the time interval 160 
necessary for the repair operations. During Phase II, the users are temporary without water, so, in this 161 
case, the water flow is equal to zero, while the ratio i
Lost iW W  is equal to 1, since
i
e in n .  Therefore, 162 
after the definition of the performance index F1(t) given in Equation (1) the corresponding resilience 163 
index is defined as  164 
1
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 where F1(t) is the performance function proportional to the number of equivalent households ne w/o 166 
service; TLC is the control time.   167 
The second performance function F2(t) relates to the tank water level, which is directly related to the 168 
reserve capacity of the tank and therefore to the technical dimension of the resilience problem. The 169 
analytical expression is defined as 170 
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where h(t) is the water level in the tank at a given instant of time, while hReserve corresponds to the 172 
reserve capacity in the tank.  In detail, if the water level is above the height corresponding to the reserve 173 
capacity hReserve , F2(t) is equal to 1, but if the level decreases below hReserve , F2(t) has a value less than 1.  174 
In this case, the Loss Function L2(I, TR) is given by 175 
2
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The loss function given in Equation (8) provides information about how much water has been lost 177 
during the earthquake and allows establishing what is the optimal strategy to recover the Reserve 178 
Capacity.   179 
The definition of performance function in equation (7) can be generalized and extended not only to 180 
tanks, but also to pumps, by using the “Hydraulic head” or “Piezometric head” which is a specific 181 
measure of liquid pressure that can also be used for pumps.   182 
With respect to Equation (2), for Equation (8) is not possible to define a fixed recovery time before the 183 
numerical simulations, because in this case TR is directly related to the type of restoration plan adopted.  184 
In Figure 1b is shown a sketch of how F2(t) looks like. The figure shows how F2(t) doesn’t return to 1 at 185 
the end of TLC , but it can assume lower values, if a proper restoration strategy is not adopted.  In this 186 
case, the Resilience Index is given by 187 
2
2
0
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T
LC
F t
R dt
T
                                                                                                                                                                       (9) 188 
 where F2(t) is the water level in the tank; TLC is the control time.  Special attention requires the 189 
definition of R2 when multiple tanks are in the network.  In this case, the index is given by  190 
2
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                                                                                                                  (10) 191 
 where wi are the weight coefficients of the n tanks in the network.  These coefficients can be evaluated 192 
using two approaches. Assuming two tanks, in the first case, the weights w1 and w2 are proportional to 193 
the average flow loss on the two pipes in which the connecting pipe is divided after the earthquake.  In 194 
the second case, the weights w1 and w2 are proportional to the reserve capacity.   195 
Since WDNs have strict requirements of ensuring water quality, the global resilience index should also 196 
include a water quality index which is related to the environmental dimension of the resilience problem.  197 
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Currently there is no globally accepted composite index of water quality. Most water quality indices rely 198 
on normalizing, or standardizing data according to expected concentrations and some interpretation of 199 
‘good’ versus ‘bad’ concentrations. Parameters are often then weighted according to their perceived 200 
importance to overall water quality and the index is calculated as the weighted average of all the 201 
observations of interest.  The authors do not want to enter in the discussion of which index is better to 202 
adopt, however once an index of water quality check Q is selected, it can be compared with its value 203 
before the earthquake event defining the following performance function   204 
 
 
3
*
Q t
F t
Q
                                                                                                                                            (11) 205 
 where Q* and Q(t) are the water quality indices before and after the seismic event respectively.  The 206 
final resilience index for water quality is defined as 207 
3
3
0
( )LC
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F t
R dt
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                                                                                                                                                                      (12) 208 
Then the three indices are combined together to have a comprehensive evaluation of the WDN, so the 209 
Global Resilience Index is defined as 210 
1 2 3R R R R                                                                                                                                                                         (13) 211 
The R index summarizes the performance of the WDN considering the demand R1 (users), the capacity 212 
R2 (water level in the tank) and the water quality R3.   213 
The metrics has been multiplied, because the global index R in equation (13) is more sensitive to the 214 
different scenario events when the three indices are multiplied. In fact some scenarios in the case study 215 
below generate high values of R1, so it seems that damage did not cause any effect, but in reality the 216 
quantity of water loss has been relevant and this cause a reduction of the water reserve capacity in the 217 
tank and consequently of R2.   218 
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CASE STUDY 219 
The methodology described above has been applied to the WDN of Calascibetta, an italian town 220 
supplying 4600 inhabitants in the Enna Province, located on Erei Mountains (Figure 2) in Sicily.  221 
 222 
Seismic hazard in the region 223 
The town did not suffer high intensity earthquakes except the ‘Noto valley earthquake’ which occurred 224 
in 1693 and produced severe damages in the entire eastern side of the island. Its intensity was about XI° 225 
of Mercalli–Cancani–Sieberg (MCS) scale, but in Calascibetta the intensity felt was about VII°.  Using 226 
the Neo-deterministic seismic hazard scenario proposed by Panza et al. (2012), the value of the peak 227 
ground velocity in the town of Calascibetta (14.4000 N 37.4000 E) is in the range between 15 and 30 228 
cm/sec (Panza et al., 2014a).  The Neo-determinist approach has been preferred with respect to the 229 
Probabilistic Seismic Hazard analysis (Cimellaro et al., 2011), because the former provides non 230 
conservative results (Panza et al., 2014b) at the specific site.  The PGV used in the analysis is the 231 
average value of 22.5 cm/s, which can be assumed constant over the entire WDN, because of the limited 232 
extension of the network.   233 
 234 
Characteristics of the water distribution network 235 
The WDN consists of two tanks:   236 
1. the roof tank (Capacity = 50 m3) located in the highest part of the town;  237 
2. St. Peter's tank (Capacity = 500 m3), which is supplied by the pipes coming from the roof tank.    238 
The water source capacity of the two tanks is the reservoir located at Ancipa Dam. The water is pumped 239 
at the roof tank from a station located at the bottom of the hill and from there, the water is distributed to 240 
district 1 and to St. Peter tank which supplies the entire city.  The paper deals only with the distribution 241 
network, while the adduction network in not considered in the analysis. The entire network is made by 242 
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polyethylene pipes which are characterized by an easy process of installation, high elasticity that allows 243 
it to absorb modest land subsidence without damage on the structure, chemical inertness against the 244 
aggressiveness of land or percolated water or liquids conveyed.  In  245 
Figure 3 is shown the plan view of the WDN of Calascibetta which is divided in eight districts.  All 246 
districts are connected through pipes which are normally closed in normal operating conditions, but they 247 
can be open in case of an emergency.  Three diameters of respectively 63, 110, 160 mm are installed in 248 
the network, while 32 mm diameter pipes have been used to connect the different services within the 249 
building.    250 
The length of the 32, 63, 110 and 160 mm diameter pipes are respectively 3728.83m, 8719.35m, 251 
4427.65 and 1115.35m.  Pressure reducing valves (PRV) have been installed in the network to maintain 252 
the pressure within certain limits which are given in Table 1, while shut-off valves have been installed to 253 
close the pipes in case of an emergency ( 254 
Figure 3).  255 
 256 
Model description, assumptions and calibration 257 
The WDN of Calascibetta has been modeled using EPANET 2.0 (Rossman, 2000). The standard 258 
procedure used in the software to evaluate the nodes’ pressure and the flow in each pipe is the Demand 259 
Driven Analysis (DDA). However, the limitation of this method is that the demand flow is fixed a priori 260 
in each node, so the DDA provides the same value of demand flow even if the pressure is below the 261 
threshold necessary to satisfy the demand in the WDN.  For these reasons, the DDA works well in 262 
normal operating conditions when there are no failures in the pipes, but if one pipe fails, the pressure in 263 
some nodes could be below the threshold value necessary to satisfy the demand.  In this case, the 264 
Pressure Driven Analysis (PDA) has been used.  So all the simulations with pipe failures start with a 265 
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DDA analysis and when the pressure in one node goes below the threshold necessary to satisfy the 266 
demand flow, it is transformed in a Emitter node (Rossman, 2000).  The PDA analysis in presence of 267 
Emitters is characterized by less flow circulating in the network and consequently by reduced hydraulic 268 
head losses when compared with the first analysis (DDA).  In the analysis, the pressure necessary to 269 
satisfy the demand flow at each node is set to 20 m of water column (2 bar),so that at least 5 m of water 270 
column are above the tallest house in Calascibetta which has an height of about 13 m.  The Darcy-271 
Weisbach formula has been used to evaluate the head losses which are given by 272 
2
( , , )
2
L v
h d q
d g
 



                                                                                                                    (14) 273 
where λ is the friction factor (depending on the roughness ε, the diameter d and the flow rate q), L is the 274 
pipe length, v is the flow velocity, g is the acceleration of gravity. The friction factor λ is estimated with 275 
the use of different equations as a function of the Reynolds Number (RE).  The roughness ε for the 276 
polyethylene pipes has been assumed constant and equal to 0.005 mm, because the pipes have been 277 
recently installed and in general, the polyethylene material maintains its hydraulics characteristics.  The 278 
concentrated losses have been neglected.  Pipes with the same features (e.g. diameter, roughness) have 279 
been combined into a single pipe with length equal to the sum of the lengths of each pipe. The pipes 280 
with diameter of 32 mm connecting to the services have been neglected. The roof tank has a cylindrical 281 
shape with a diameter of 3 m, while St.Peter tank is composed by two tanks of rectangular shape that 282 
cover an area of 66 m2 each. To simplify the modeling in EPANET the rectangular tank has been 283 
replaced with an equivalent tank with a diameter of 12.95m that have a cylindrical shape of the same 284 
volume ( 4 4 132 12.95D A m     ).  The variation of water flow demand over the 24 hours has 285 
been determined using the data provided from the operator from July 2011 to June 2012.  In particular, 286 
the water flow demand is obtained as average of a monthly time pattern for each district. For example, 287 
Figure 4 shows the water flow demand related to District 1.   Pipe breaks and leaks have been modeled 288 
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in EPANET using the scheme shown in Figure 5, however simulations have been focusing only on pipes 289 
breaks which are assumed to happen in the middle point of the pipe.  Then at the end-parts of the 290 
divided pipe, two reservoirs are added to simulate the water flow through the crack.  The tanks have a 291 
hydraulic head equal to the elevation of the break point which is evaluated with a linear interpolation 292 
between the two nodes of the original pipe. Finally, a valve is inserted on each new pipe so that the 293 
water can only flow from the broken pipe to the tanks and not vice versa.   294 
 295 
Seismic Damage Model for water pipes 296 
Pipeline damage models for the seismic vulnerability assessment are usually formulated as the repair 297 
rate for unit length of pipes. These models can be derived from the data collected during previous 298 
seismic events or any other hazard which produced breakages in the pipes.  In this research, the well 299 
known model in the American Lifeline Alliance (ALA, 2001) has been used. In particular, the repair rate 300 
is defined as  301 
(0.00187)RR K PGV                                                                                                                (15) 302 
where RR is the Repair Rate which is the number of pipe breaks per 1000 ft (305 m) of pipe, K is a 303 
coefficient determined by the pipe material, pipe joint type, pipe diameter, type of fitting and soil 304 
condition and the PGV is the peak ground velocity which has the units in in/s.  K is assumed 0.5, 305 
because in Calascibetta are polyethylene pipes and the type of fitting adopted is rubber gasket, while the 306 
PGV is assumed equal to 22.5 cm/s (8.86 in/s).  So applying Equation (15), the value of RR is equal to 307 
0.008.  Furthermore, the WDN of Calascibetta consists of pipes of different importance, which have 308 
been distinguished in four groups: (1) main pipes, (2) pipes at the entrance of each district, (3) 309 
connecting pipes and (4) plain pipes within each district. In order to take into account the different 310 
importance of each pipe Equation (15) has been modified introducing the importance factor (Im), thus 311 
15 
 
m (0.00187)RR I K PGV                                                                                                              (16) 312 
where Im is assumed equal to 2, 1.5, 1 and 0.8, respectively. Finally, the probability of having a number 313 
n of breakages in a pipe of length L is given by the following expression 314 
( )
( )
!
n
RR LRR LP n e
n
                                                                                                                   (17) 315 
where n is the number of pipe breaks, RR the repair ratio evaluated using Equation (16) and L is  the 316 
length of pipe (expressed in terms of 1000-ft segment USCS).  Figure 6 shows the probability of having 317 
a certain number of breaks in the WDN of Calascibetta. The figure justifies the choice of selecting the 318 
scenarios with a single break, because the probability of having two breaks is negligible.   319 
 320 
Risk of pipe failure 321 
The risk of failure of a WDN can be obtained using its topology and the failure probability P(n) of every 322 
pipe. The failure to deliver a sufficient amount of water from an inflow node i to an outflow node j, can 323 
be defined as the probability that the hydraulic head goes below a specified threshold value. Therefore, 324 
the probability of failure of a network can be obtained after the hydraulic analysis of a damaged 325 
network. Then Monte Carlo simulations are employed reducing the network topology by removing the 326 
pipes segments based on the failure probability of every pipe P(n).  Once the failed pipes are removed, 327 
an algorithm based on Graph Theory can be used to determine whether a path between an inflow and an 328 
outflow node exists. For every damaged network created, Monte Carlo simulations have been employed 329 
using 5000 runs in order to calculate the statistics of the hydraulic quantities of interest.  The procedure 330 
is discussed in detail in Fragiadakis and Christodoulou (2014).   331 
 332 
Selection of scenarios event   333 
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Classical risk analysis has different assumptions, objectives and methods which are not sufficient for 334 
resilient design, so the departure from the traditional design practices are needed (Park et al., 2013). 335 
Resilience is a dynamic quantity that must be constantly managed and is characterized by a lack of 336 
certainty.  The uncertainty of potential future disruptions makes the use of scenarios important.  In this 337 
work, four types of scenarios that cover a wide range of potential occurrences for the WDN of 338 
Calascibetta have been selected based on a “hybrid approach” which combines Monte Carlo based 339 
algorithm with engineering judgment.  The Monte Carlo based algorithm allows assessing the 340 
preliminary failure probabilities in various locations within the network.  The reason for combining the 341 
engineering judgment in the approach lies on the topology of the WDN of Calascibetta. The network is 342 
divided in 8 districts connected with a main pipe and several connecting pipes.  343 
The main pipe and the connecting ones are important because if they fail, the entire district will remain 344 
without water, so additional scenarios have been selected for explicitly assessing their significance.  345 
However, the failures within the district of smaller diameter pipes have been also selected.  346 
Four groups of scenarios (S1, S2, S3 and S4) have been selected to examine the effect of different types of 347 
pipe failures. S denotes a “Scenario” and the subscript number indicates the group to which each 348 
scenario belongs ( 349 
Figure 7).  In detail, the following groups of scenarios in Table 2 have been analyzed: 350 
1. Group S1 includes scenarios with one break on the main pipeline and the supply pipe of the St. 351 
Peter Tank; 352 
2. Group S2 includes all scenarios with breaks in the supply pipes of each district; 353 
3. Group S3 includes all scenarios where the breaks occur in the districts;  354 
4. Group S4 includes all scenarios where the breaks occur in the connecting pipes. 355 
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Within group S3, the scenarios inside each district have been selected, so that the impact of pressure drop 356 
and of the number of users affected is maximized. Typically, eight damaged events for every district 357 
have been randomly created, with the exceptions of District 7 where six scenarios have been selected 358 
and District 1 where 12 scenarios have been selected (the largest district).  Figure 8 shows the scenarios 359 
considered for District 6, while in Figure 9 are plotted the average pressures for each scenario and 360 
compared to the average pressure in normal operating conditions.  During the selection of the scenarios 361 
for every District, generally it is noticed that the peripheral areas inside each District have less influence 362 
on the global district pressure when one pipe fails.  However, other factors can also affect the scenario 363 
selection such as the topographic features of the district, the number of users and the valve distribution 364 
etc.  For example in District 1, because for almost all the assumed scenarios the average pressure level is 365 
the same, the scenario with the highest number of users without water service has been selected.   366 
 367 
Recovery time and restoration process 368 
In the case study, the control time TLC is assumed equal to 48 hours which is the time to repair the 369 
damaged pipe according to the emergency plan of the Water distribution Provider in the region.  370 
According to the information provided by the operator (AcquaEnna S.C.p.A) of the WDN, after the 371 
earthquake, the first emergency operations (e.g. isolate the zone where the pipe is damaged) are realized 372 
within 1 hour, while the repair operations, if the diameter is less than 600 mm, are realized in maximum 373 
12 hours.  Additionally other 24 hours has been added, because that is the time necessary to inform in 374 
advance the residents of the repair operations.  Finally, TR. has been assumed equal to 38 hours (one 375 
hour has been added to include the uncertainties) and it is assumed constant for all the simulations. 376 
 377 
Numerical results and lesson learned  378 
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In Table 3 are summarized the resilience indices according to Equation (6), (9) and (13) for the different 379 
scenarios selected.  In the analyses, it is assumed that the water quality check (e.g. hardness, presence of 380 
contaminants, etc.) remains above the standards defined by the law and constant before and after the 381 
repair, therefore the index R3 is not shown in the results.  The index R1 is function of the number of 382 
households without water and it is lower in the districts where the pipe failure is selected, while it 383 
remains constant in other districts, because the effect of the pipe failure is confined in the district using 384 
valves.  As expected, the lowest value of R1 index is obtained with scenario 1, which corresponds to 385 
failure in the main pipeline.  In this case, the seven districts supplied by the main pipeline, remain 386 
without water until the pipeline is repaired.  This generates a drop of the function F1(t) and therefore of 387 
R1. The same observation applies to scenarios 21 and 28 that involve the main pipeline.  The index R2 388 
instead is more sensitive than R1 for the selected scenarios, because is affected by the volume of water 389 
loss which is function of the pipe diameter and the location of the breakage.  In fact, if the breakage 390 
affects a pipe which provide water to several households, during the repair operation when the pipe is 391 
isolated, the water tank level increase and so the value of R2.  For example, during Scenario 1, which 392 
corresponds to the main pipeline failure, the entire pipe is isolated and all districts are without water.  393 
Consequently, the water level in the tank increases because the seven districts are without water supply, 394 
and then the R2 index increases.  Scenario 9 (breakage at the input pipe of district 8) is the worst in term 395 
of R2, because for the particular position of this pipe and for its diameter (110 mm), the flow rate loss is 396 
about 75 l/s and this leads emptying St.Peter Tank.  Because both indices are equally important to 397 
describe certain scenarios, they have been combined together in a global index R which is the synthesis 398 
of the information obtained from R1 and R2. Further considerations are necessary for the scenario 18 399 
when the Index R2 is evaluated.  In this case, the failure is in the pipe connecting District 1 which is 400 
supplied by the Roof Tank and District 2 which is supplied by St.Peter Tank, therefore, the index R2 is 401 
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determined using a weight average which is given in Equation (10) where w1 and w2 are weight 402 
coefficients of the Roof Tank and St.Peter Tank respectively.   403 
Following the two approaches mentioned in previous section, the weights w1 =0.3274 and w2 =0.6726 404 
are determined using the first approach, while w1 =0.0693 and w2 =0.9307 are determined using the 405 
second approach when they are proportional to the reserve capacity which is 31.62 m3for the Roof tank 406 
and 424.82 m3 for San Peter tank, respectively.  However, in all tables and figures the results related to 407 
scenario 18 refer to the second approach, which is more general.  The sensitivity of the Resilience 408 
indicators (R1, R2 & R) to the time of the earthquake occurrence during the day is shown in  409 
Figure 10 for the scenario 9.  The Resilience Index R2, instead, doesn’t have any significant variations 410 
with respect to the earthquake occurrence during the day.  Instead, for index R1, if the earthquake occurs 411 
at 1 am and failure corresponds to scenario 9, then St.Peter tank is empty, because of the flow rate loss.  412 
However, because in the evening the demand flow is less than the input flow, the tank starts increasing 413 
its water level and in 24 hours is able to cover the total demand flow.  Instead, if the earthquake occurs 414 
at 6 am, the demand flow has its peak and the tank in less than 2 hours decreases its water level until it 415 
empties to cover the demand and the flow rate loss.  From that moment, the tank remains empty, 416 
because the demand flow continues to be higher than the input flow. Only when the output flow is less 417 
than the input flow, then the water level starts increasing ( 418 
Figure 10).   419 
 420 
Restoration plans 421 
Three different restoration plans have been proposed.  The first restoration plan involves the closure of 422 
the tanks until the entire reserve capacity is recovered.  The minimum and the maximum variation of 423 
recovery time TR to restore the full capacity in the tanks for the different scenarios are plotted in Figure 424 
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11.  Please note that for the scenarios 1, 2, 10, 21, 28 and 29 the recovery time is not shown, because the 425 
reserve is automatically recovered during the time interval TLC. 426 
The maximum and the minimum recovery time in Figure 11 has been evaluated using the procedure 427 
described in Figure 12 for scenario 12 where is plotted the tank water height vs. time (hours) right after 428 
the earthquake.  The bold line represents the water level in normal operating conditions, while the gray 429 
line the water level when no recovery strategies have been applied.  At the end of the control time TLC, 430 
the final water height hFinal will be less than the reserve height hReserve (4.47 m for the Roof Tank, 3.23 m 431 
for St. Peter Tank). This is happening because in normal operating conditions, the final water height is 432 
higher than the water reserve height, because the reserve capacity of the tank is not used.  However, 433 
when the pipe fails the water reserve capacity of the tank is used to satisfy the water demand, so the final 434 
water height will be lower than the water reserve height.  The difference between these two values (Δh= 435 
hReserve - hFinal) has led to the construction of the gray dashed line in Figure 12 that is the target to reach 436 
for recovering the reserve capacity.  In particular, the grey line (No restore) is translated of Δh to have a 437 
curve that follows the water demand and that reaches the hReserve at the end of the 48 hours.  The others 438 
curves correspond to different instants when the tank is closed.  The straight lines derive from the 439 
assumption of constant water flow in the tank when it is closed, therefore they can estimate the time 440 
interval to recover the reserve capacity and when the entities suffer water outage.  For example, for 441 
scenario 12, the maximum recovery time is 13 hours and the minimum is 6 hours. The minimum and the 442 
maximum recovery time will depend on Δh.  With the restoration strategy above, no other costs of 443 
electricity due to the use of pumps must be added, but in that time interval, the users remain without 444 
water supply.   445 
The second restoration plan involves the use of the maximum available flow from the pump 446 
station. In normal operating conditions, the input flow to the distribution system is about 5.44 l/s.  447 
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Neglecting the physiological water losses, the input flow in the roof tank is around 1.16 l/s, while the 448 
input flow in the St.Peter tank is 4.28 l/s. In emergency conditions, the pump station can supply a 449 
maximum flow of 19 l/s. With this flow rate, the recovery times of the reserve capacity have been 450 
calculated for the selected scenarios, using the following equation 451 
 
( )
/1000
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R
e
h A
T h
t Q
 
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 
                                                                                                               (18) 452 
where Δh= hReserve - hFinal in m, AT is the tank’s area in m2, Qe in l/s is the available flow to be added to 453 
recover the water reserve capacity, Δt is equal to 3600 s. In Figure 13 are shown the values of the 454 
recovery time TR for the second restoration plan.  In the selected scenarios, the total reserve capacity 455 
which is recovered corresponds to the one of St.Peter Tank, that is equal to Qe = 13.56 l/s, where Qe= 456 
(19-1.16-4.28) = 13.56 l/s.  Please note that for the scenarios 1, 2, 10, 18 and 28 the recovery time is not 457 
shown, because the reserve is automatically recovered.  The higher recovery times are obtained for the 458 
scenarios with the lowest hFinal and consequently the lowest R2 values.  With this strategy, the recovery 459 
time TR is reduced, but the cost of electricity, deriving from the use of pumps is increased.  460 
The third restoration plan is a hybrid combination of the first two strategies.  First, the water tank 461 
is closed for the first seven hours in the morning and then part of the available flow is used for 462 
recovering the water reserve capacity.  The advantage of this restoration plan is based on the limited use 463 
of the available flow from the pump station and the reduced amount of downtime for the water tank, 464 
which is going to be closed only in the early morning, generating less discomfort for the residents.  The 465 
available flow Qe is obtained using the following equation: 466 
T
e
R
h A
Q
t T
 

 
                                                                                                                                (19) 467 
 where the recovery time TR is equal to 7 hours (fixed), while Δh= hReserve - hFinal will be higher than the 468 
value obtained in the second strategy, because the final water height increases after the closure of the 469 
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tank.  This strategy can be adopted for those scenarios where the recovery time TR is higher with respect 470 
to the other two strategies.  Please note that in the third strategy the recovery time TR is measured as sum 471 
of the period the tank is closed plus the period the pumps are operating.  The use of the third restoration 472 
strategy produces an increase of the R2 value, but also produces a decrease on R1 value caused by the 473 
closure of the tank.  The combined index R given in Equation (10) does not change with respect to the 474 
condition when no retrofit strategies are applied.  For example, in scenario 12 the R2 for the Minimum 475 
Recovery Time (6 hours) is 0.82; the corresponding R1 is equal to 0.87 and then the combined index R is 476 
0.71, which is the same when no restoration plans are taken into account.  In this case, it is 477 
recommended to work with only one of the two indices to appreciate the effect of the retrofit strategy 478 
proposed.  These considerations bring also to the conclusion that the third restoration plan should be 479 
used only for scenarios where the recovery time TR is short (e.g. scenarios 13, 15 and 29).  The use of 480 
the second or third restoration plan produces an overall improvement of the indices as shown in Figure 481 
13 and Figure 14. In fact, with these strategies the index R2 improves, while the index R1 is maintained 482 
at the same level in the second strategy, and it undergoes a slight reduction in the third strategy.  The 483 
improvement of the global index R with respect to the initial condition shows the validity of the selected 484 
retrofit strategies (Figure 15).   485 
Between the scenarios selected, scenario 18 is interesting, because in this case the two tanks (Roof and 486 
St.Peter) are working in parallel at the same time. This implies that the three restoration strategies should 487 
be applied on the two tanks simultaneously. For the first strategy, the recovery time Tr for the roof tank 488 
is between 3 and 9 hours, while for St. Peter tank is between 9 and 15 hours.  For the second strategy, 489 
using the same weight coefficients described above, the flow in the roof tank and the flow in St.Peter 490 
tank are determined as weight average of the maximum available flow Qe = 13.56 l/s.  Using the second 491 
restoration plan the recovery times are 5 hours and 16 minutes in the roof tank and 3 hours and 40 492 
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minutes in St. Peter tank.  For the third restoration plan, the flow rate necessary to recover the reserve 493 
capacity is Qe is 0.31 l/s (hFinal = 3.52 m) for the Roof tank, while for St.Peter tank Qe is 5.8 l/s (hFinal = 494 
2.14 m).   495 
Scenario 29 requires also attention, because in this case the pipeline that supplies the St. Peter tank fails, 496 
so the tank is able to provide water to the distribution system for the first 32 hours, but then it empties 497 
before the repair operations finish.  In this case, the most suitable restoration strategies are the second 498 
and the third one.  When the pipeline has been fixed, the incoming maximum available flow permits the 499 
restoration of the reserve capacity in the water tank in about 9 hours.  For the third restoration plan, the 500 
available flow should be equal to 16.78 l/s.  The restoration plan 1 can not be used, because when the 501 
incoming pipe is under repair, no input flow can supply the tank which is closed, and the restoration of 502 
the reserve capacity doesn’t occur.   503 
So the lesson learned is that applying one strategy with respect to the other depends on several 504 
considerations such as the cost of electricity, the possibility to use the maximum available flow from the 505 
pumps, the extension of the tank downtime and its effects on consumers, etc..  Although all these aspects 506 
are very important, they have not been quantified in the selection of the optimal restoration plans and are 507 
not been discussed in this paper, but they will be addressed by the authors in future research.   508 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  509 
A new resilience index R to measure the performance of a water distribution network (WDN) is 510 
proposed, which combines both the technical, the environmental and the social dimension of resilience.  511 
The metric is based on the combination of three indices which are defined in term of functionality F(t) 512 
and recovery time TR.  The proposed indicator not only considers the initial losses, but it also attempts to 513 
assess the restoration process of the system.  The sensitivity analysis of the global resilience index R to 514 
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different disruptions scenarios in the WDN of a small town in the south of Italy is presented.  The 515 
numerical results in EPANET have shown the positive effect of the separation in districts of the network 516 
and the need to use the indices separately, because in some scenarios have been observed opposite 517 
trends.  Three different recovery plans have been compared considering the different disruption 518 
scenarios using the proposed indices.  Between the different restoration plans, the first one 519 
corresponding to closing the tank for the entire town should be used with caution, because if the 520 
recovery time is long, it can create widespread disservices to the residents. Therefore, it is suggested to 521 
use this plan only when the quantity of water loss due to the damage pipes is modest, and consequently 522 
the tank can recover its water level in few hours.  Instead, the hybrid approach (third strategy) can be 523 
adopted for those scenarios where the recovery time TR is higher with respect to the other two strategies. 524 
In fact, it produces both an increment of the R2 index and a decrease of the R1 index caused by the 525 
closure of the tank.  The considerations introduced in this paper need to be further developed and 526 
expanded by the researchers and designers who deal with WDNs.  In particular the proposed indicator 527 
could be easily included into a knowledge based Decision Support System aimed at helping the 528 
Governmental agencies in selecting the most appropriate design for WDNs, by incorporating also the 529 
environmental and social dimension in the design process.   530 
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 670 
Table 1-Charateristics of the pressure Reducing Valves 671 
Id. code Location D 
(mm) 
Meters  
Head 
(m) 
PRV1 Via Dranza 63 20.0 
PRV2 Via Giudea 63 15.0 
PRV3 Via Vita 63 20.0 
PRV4 Via Roma 110 20.0 
PRV5 Via Maddalena II 110 15.0 
PRV6 Via Teatro 63 25.0 
PRV7 Via Maddalena II 110 20.0 
 672 
  673 
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 674 
Table 2- Scenarios considered in the analysis 675 
Scenario District Location  
& Group 
Location D  
(mm) 
Average Flow loss  
(l/s) 
1 S1_Main Pipeline Break of DN 160 PE pipe in Via Conte Ruggero 160 90.11 
2 S2_District 1 Break of DN 160 PE pipe in Matrice Square 160 180 
3 S2_District 2 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Giudea 63 61.4 
4 S2_District 3 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Vita 63 48.63 
5 S2_District 4 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Nazionale SS 290 63 53.80 
6 S2_District 5 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Nazionale SS 290 110 77.35 
7 S2_District 6 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Teatro 63 53.82 
8 S2_District 7 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Maddalena II 110 48.36 
9 S2_District 8 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Nazionale SS 290 110 75 
10 S3_District 1 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Itria 63 33.48 
11 S3_District 2 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Giudea 110 66.61 
12 S3_District 3 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Minavento 63 21.51 
13 S3_District 4 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via San Antonio 63 24.47 
14 S3_District 5 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Maddalena II 110 55.25 
15 S3_District 6 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Annunziata 63 29.55 
16 S3_District 7 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Maddalena II 110 38.78 
17 S3_District 8 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Nazionale SS 290 110 44.54 
18 S4_D1-D2 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Umberto Square 63 58.05 
19 S4_D2-D6 (I) Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Roma 110 71.75 
20 S4_D2-D6 (II) Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Roma 110 70.29 
21 S4_D2-MP Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Nazionale SS 290 110 87.59 
22 S4_D3-D6 (I) Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Fontana 63 33.01 
23 S4_D3-D6 (II) Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Aquila 63 33.29 
24 S4_D3-D8 (I) Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Scarlata 63 31.72 
25 S4_D3-D8 (II) Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Scarlata 63 28.49 
26 S4_D4-D5 Break of DN 110 PE pipe in Via Chiusa 110 63 
27 S4_D4-D8 Break of DN 63 PE pipe in Via Lucchese 63 27.94 
28 S4_D6-MP Break of DN 160 PE pipe in Umberto Square 160 78.04 
29 S1_MainPipeline Braek of DN 110 PE pipe in Via P.D’Aragona 110 4.28 
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 679 
Table 3- Resilience Index summary for different scenario events 680 
Scenario R1 R2 R=R1R2 Scenario R1 R2 R=R1R2 Scenario R1 R2 R=R1R2 
1 0.40 0.69 0.28 11 0.92 0.19 0.18 20 0.86 0.23 0.20 
2 0.79 0.88 0.69 12 0.95 0.74 0.71 21 0.58 0.64 0.37 
3 0.92 0.23 0.21 13 0.83 0.83 0.68 22 0.84 0.64 0.54 
4 0.95 0.31 0.29 14 0.93 0.45 0.42 23 0.84 0.64 0.54 
5 0.82 0.34 0.28 15 0.89 0.91 0.81 24 0.93 0.60 0.56 
6 0.90 0.33 0.30 16 0.97 0.56 0.54 25 0.94 0.64 0.60 
7 0.88 0.31 0.28 17 0.92 0.41 0.37 26 0.85 0.36 0.30 
8 0.97 0.38 0.37 18 0.88 0.57 0.5 27 0.96 0.65 0.62 
9 0.87 0.11 0.10 19 0.86 0.23 0.20 28 0.42 0.69 0.29 
10 0.90 0.59 0.53     29 0.78 0.36 0.28 
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